Abstract of "The Law of Signatures" (1992)

• In criticizing J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, Jacques Derrida and Jonathan Culler have argued, in part, that Austin misunderstands how signatures function. They claim that he ignores the essentially formal and "iterable" structure of a signature--a structure that betrays the absence of any subjective consciousness on the part of the signer. I argue that their concept of iterability does not apply to this case. Rather, legal practice in the England and the United States, as also in France, countenances a wide range of variation for signatures, variation that is consistent with and legitimized by Austinian assumptions about personal agency. Such variability has literary as well as legal implications.

Michael Hancher

Department of English, University of Minnesota

URL: http://umn.edu/home/mh/abslawsg.html

Comments to: mh@umn.edu

Created February 1995

Last revised 17 September 1996